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Abstract 
The reliability of wave energy converters (WECs) is 
a key issue that has to be addressed in order to make 
them a viable energy option. At this stage of early 
industrial development the reliability assessment of 
WECs is a challenging task. In this paper existing 
reliability methods, namely Reliability Block diagrams, 
have been applied to a notional configuration. It was 
found that omnipresent lack of failure rate data makes 
rather crude adjustments of often generic data 
necessary which generally lead to rather unfavourable 
and highly uncertain results. Reliability data is either 
not available due to sparse field experience or is kept 
confidential, within different project developments to 
secure competitive advantages and intellectual 
property.  
 
In order to foster the progress of the marine energy 
industry, the reliability of devices must be 
demonstrated and improved. This requires a joint effort 
between industry stakeholders to collect, share and 
disseminate existing failure knowledge and future 
operational experience.  
 
Keywords: Failure rate adjustment, Marine energy, 
Reliability assessment, Reliability Block Diagrams 
Nomenclature 
λB = base failure rate 
πE = environmental adjustment factor 
πFM  = specific failure mode factor  
πDS  = data source uncertainty factor 
πC  = component failure rate 
RSys = system reliability 
RPT = reliability power transmission 
RPTO = reliability power take-off 
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1 Introduction 
Ocean wave energy is becoming a field of great 
interest as it offers both sustainable electricity 
generation and the emergence of a new industry sector. 
Currently several wave energy devices are proceeding 
from the prototype stage towards commercial 
deployment. Whereas prototypes require the 
demonstration of, e.g. fundamental working principles, 
conversion efficiency and survivability; commercial 
deployment is driven by plant-performance indicators 
like reliability, availability and maintainability which 
heavily influence cost and revenue. A concise 
reliability assessment of WECs forms the basis for the 
commercial case. The necessary long term investments 
make reliability a key challenge towards developing 
economically viable wave energy devices. 
2 Challenges to Conventional Reliability 
Analysis 
2.1 Traditional Approaches 
Reliability analysis is a well-developed statistical 
tool for predicting performance of installations in many 
industries.  Many of the tools and methods currently in 
use were developed by the aviation industry, where 
reliability of components is essential as failures can 
have extreme consequences in terms of loss of life.  
The methods developed for the aviation industry [1] 
have since been translated to the oil and gas industry 
where, as well as the safety and environmental 
consequences, equipment failure can have large 
consequences in terms of lost profits if an installation 
has to suspend production for any period of time.  As 
the wave energy industry matures, reliability is again of 
high importance, with the consequence of failures 
requiring, in many cases, expensive and complex 
interventions, which must be carried out in an 
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inherently harsh environment, even at the prototype 
stage. 
There are several tools used for reliability prediction 
and lifecycle management with the aim of optimising 
availability of equipment, and some of these are 
described briefly below. 
 
2.1.1 Reliability Block Diagrams 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) provide a 
diagrammatical representation of a system’s reliability 
performance.  The development of an RBD requires the 
definition of success for the system (such as its ability 
to produce power), followed by a division into blocks 
of equipment which reflect the logical behaviour of the 
system.  Each block should be statistically independent 
and as large as possible.  Each block then has an 
associated probabilistic failure rate based upon the 
arrangement of equipment it represents (considering 
such aspects as single point failures, redundancy, etc.).  
By linking all blocks up into a ‘success path’, it is 
possible to produce a stochastic representation of the 
system’s probability of failure in a given period of 
time. 
2.1.2 Fault Trees 
The fault tree provides a diagrammatic 
representation of a system’s reliability.  In this case, the 
objective is to estimate the probability of a critical fault 
occurring.  Fault trees provide a static picture of the 
combinations of failures and events that can cause the 
specified critical fault to occur.  Fault tree analysis may 
be made quantitative by applying probabilities to the 
failures and events that have to occur to result in the 
specified event. 
2.1.3 Availability Assessment 
A standard practice in the performance forecasting 
industry is to use statistical methods based on discrete 
event simulation, with the major output of such a 
method being the total availability of the system over 
the given timeframe.  The methods require that each 
component or sub-system is assigned a probabilistic 
distribution representing the statistical description of its 
time to failure, and another distribution for the time to 
repair, along with the interval between planned 
maintenance.  The model chooses a value for the time 
to failure of each component from the distributions and 
runs the simulation until the first event occurs (either a 
failure or a planned maintenance), at which time an 
action is usually required (which could be shutdown for 
maintenance or maintenance on-line depending on the 
nature of the failure).  The downtime associated with 
the event is calculated, and the simulation runs to the 
next event.  Once the simulation has been run for the 
specified lifetime of the system, the total downtime is 
calculated and a value for the system availability in that 
time can be produced. This provides a SINGLE 
estimate of the properties of the system governed by 
statistical variations and the simulation (model) must 
therefore be run many times to obtain the statistical 
distributions for the system response to determine the 
most likely values, and provide an estimate of 
uncertainty in the result.  The level of uncertainty in the 
analysis ultimately depends upon the accuracy of the 
input parameters (failure rates and distributions). It is 
also possible to run a sensitivity analysis, which 
indicates the factor(s) that have the largest impact 
(positive or negative) on the result, and this can be used 
to target resources in the most cost-effective manner.  
2.2 Lack of Data 
In mature industries, such as the oil and gas industry, 
there is a considerable history and experience in the use 
of specific equipment, and consequentially a large 
volume of reliability data is available.  In some cases 
this has been collated in databases (such as OREDA 
[2]), which are consulted by reliability analysts for use 
in simulations.  The production of this database had a 
considerable influence on the development of the 
offshore oil and gas industry. 
 
While this data includes several components and 
sub-systems which are regularly employed in the 
design of new wave energy converters, there are 
several problems with the application of these data in 
reliability analyses for these new systems.  The most 
obvious problem is often the novel use of an existing 
technology, either with a new duty cycle, or in a new 
environment.  Such changes in the way a component is 
employed will have a large impact on the time to 
failure and the critical failure modes of the technology, 
and the existing failure data may no longer be directly 
applicable. 
 
A larger, albeit less obvious problem is the 
requirement for routine maintenance in order to keep 
the equipment performing as required.  Most offshore 
installations are frequently (if not constantly) manned, 
and simple regular maintenance routines are employed 
to prevent large failures from occurring.  Data from 
databases such as OREDA presents failure rates and 
interventions outside this routine maintenance (i.e. only 
unplanned interventions), with the implication that use 
of these data is only accurate on the assumption that 
routine maintenance is possible on the equipment.  For 
many designs of wave energy converter, because of the 
necessarily hostile environment into which they will be 
installed, maintenance may be impossible for a large 
proportion of the year.  This presents a large problem 
for the supply of this equipment as times between 
interventions are likely to be significantly greater than 
for conventional installations. 
2.3 IP / Competitive Advantage constraints 
A further complication comes with the competitive 
nature of the industry at this stage.  Reliability data 
gathered by a device developer represents a significant 
investment by them, but is also seen to provide a 
competitive advantage over competitors.  For this 
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reason, device developers are at present unlikely to be 
willing to share any data they produce. 
 
There have been similar problems in the offshore oil 
and gas industry, in terms of presentation of data in a 
confidential manner.  This was overcome in the 
OREDA project [2] by using a procedure for reporting 
and presenting reliability data from operators in a 
manner which does not allow for identification of 
specific manufacturers, and the processes developed 
are formalised in the international standard ISO 14224.  
In the wave energy industry in its present state, the 
device designs are so specific that it is again likely to 
be difficult to maintain the anonymity of the device.  
However, the solutions and procedures to this problem 
have been developed during the OREDA project as 
noted above, and the benefit of such collaboration 
between developers would be to solve a problem which 
it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) for any one 
developer to solve on their own due to time and 
resource constraints, not to mention the problems with 
small sample sizes. 
 
These issues demonstrate the importance not only of 
collection of reliability data for the wave energy 
industry, but also of the collaboration between device 
developers to provide sufficient data to solve the 
problems which all developers will face.  The 
experience to develop such a database exists from 
previous projects, which would allow the data to be 
processed into a useful form for future reliability 
assessments. 
2.4 Necessity of Crude Adjustments 
Many companies currently designing wave energy 
converters aim to use existing, proven technology as far 
as possible.  However, as described above, the 
equipment is generally used in a slightly different way 
to its usual application, either in terms of loading, 
operating environment or accessibility for maintenance.  
This necessitates the adjustment of existing reliability 
data for the new aspect in the design. 
 
This assessment of the level of adjustment can be 
made by qualitative means by comparing some aspects 
of the application of the component between the new 
system and that from which the reliability data was 
collected (for example, movement from a well 
controlled, dry environment to a more corrosive 
environment in the splash zone can be expected to 
result in an increase in the rate of corrosion, and 
therefore an increase in the failure rate for the 
associated failure modes).  In some cases, this 
comparison can be made quantitatively by comparing 
lifetime loading and duty cycles for the component, and 
adjusting the frequency of usage-based failure modes 
based on the difference.    
 
Although there may be some logic behind these 
methods, it is important to note that they are far from 
accurate.  The effect of the changes in application on 
the given failure rate is not easily estimable, and will 
increase the uncertainty in the overall estimation of 
reliability as the boundaries of the failure rate 
distributions are moved, a little or a lot depending upon 
the ‘fit’ of the data to the application.  For this reason, 
it is important to have some means of producing useful 
reliability data (for similar duty cycles in similar 
environments) for some critical components used in 
wave energy converters, for the benefit of device 
developers.   
2.5 Component Testing 
The most obvious, and probably most feasible, way 
of producing reliability data in the near future will be 
by component lifecycle testing.  As discussed in 
previous papers [3], this may be used to circumvent the 
problems with investment and competitive advantage 
for the device developers, as the investment can be 
made by other stakeholders in the industry.  Providing 
the components for testing are selected correctly (i.e. 
not specific to any one device) and the data is presented 
in a confidential manner using the practices developed 
in projects such as OREDA, it should be possible to 
begin the production of useful data on failure rates and 
failure modes.  The most efficient way of achieving this 
initially may be to target components for which data 
already exists and see how the reliability data should be 
modified for WECs, providing guidance for other 
components.  This would likely require fewer resources 
than testing all components to generate reliability data. 
 
The selection of the criteria for which components to 
test, and the environment and loading for testing, is a 
complex issue and will require some discussion. 
3 Case study 
Similarly to the situation of the processing plant 
industry in the late 1990s, the lack of comprehensive 
data on equipment failures and load distributions poses 
the main limitation to reliability assessments [4]. An 
approach based on the assumption of constant failure 
rates and crude data adjustments in combination with a 
sensitivity analysis appears to be the best currently 
available in order to determine the reliability and 
identify critical items of WECs. At later stages 
environmental, operating and maintenance conditions 
may be revised to evaluate their impact on degradation 
processes, failure frequencies and repair/replacement 
times. This case study investigates the reliability of a 
generic hydraulic WEC, due to the fact that sufficient 
technical information and failure rate data could be 
found for this type of device which mainly comprises 
off-the shelf components. The intention of this study is 
to indicate the problems that an external agency will 
have in developing realistic assessments of the 
reliability of such a system using generic data. It must 
be stressed, that the analysis does not intend to derive 
actual reliability figures for any specific device, and 
serves only to illustrate the problem of reliability 
prediction for WECs. 
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3.1 Methodology  
In the following, the functional structure of a system 
is illustrated by Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs). 
The considered timeframe is the useful life of the 
system, i.e. the bottom of the bathtub-curve with 
assumed constant failure rates. The reasoning for both 
choices lies in the scarce information for WECs. A 
more detailed knowledge of the system layout and 
single functions would be necessary to conduct more 
sophisticated analytical state-space models (e.g. 
Markov chains) and system simulations. Operational 
experience and lifetime data, crucial to consider early 
failures and wear-out mechanisms are sparse 
information. Thus, it is difficult to abandon the 
assumption of constant failure rates which entails a 
tendency to underestimate failure rates at early stages 
in product life. This reliability assessment comprises 
six primary steps: 
 
1. Development of a system block model 
2. Collection of component failure rates from 
reliability databases 
3. Adjustment of failure rates towards the 
expected application / environmental effects 
4. Data input to the system model and reliability 
calculation 
5. Data variation  
6. Result analysis  
 
3.1.1 System Block Model 
The purpose of a WEC system is the generation of 
electricity utilising the energy of the waves. Despite the 
different constructions and working principles of 
WECs, from a functional viewpoint there exist great 
similarities [5]. Fig.1 shows a generic RBD for a wave 
energy device (based on [6]). The WEC system 
comprises four sub-systems, which are common to all 
devices. 
In the case of near shore and offshore devices the 
moorings warrant the station keeping of the device. The 
structure provides shelter for the power take-off (PTO) 
machinery, maintains the system’s level of buoyancy 
and withstands applied loadings. The PTO converts the 
wave energy input into electricity, which in turn is 
transmitted to shore via the power transmission sub-
system. The transmission sub-system for offshore 
applications can be further divided into the busbar 
which provides electrical connection within the device; 
the transformer increases the voltage level; a circuit 
breaker which allows the separation of the device from 
the grid; the umbilical enables data transfer to and from 
the device and the sea cable conducts the electricity to 
the shore grid station. The other sub-systems are highly 
device-specific and depend on both conversion 
principle (hydraulic; air- or water turbines; linear 
permanent magnets) and location.  
 
 
Wave energy converter
Mooring Structure
Power
take off
Power
transmission
Busbar Transformer
Circuit 
breaker
Umbilical Sea cable
Sub-system level
Component / part level
System level
Operating environment Failure rates
Material properties
Failure rate impactEnvironmental effects
 
Figure 1: Generic Reliability Block Diagram for wave energy 
converter 
3.1.2 Reliability data and adjustment 
The data used for the reliability assessment was 
collected from various sources and databases [2, 7-11] 
available in the public domain. An already existing 
embryonic database compiled by [12] was extended 
and failure rate adjustments accounting for data sources 
and environmental loading conditions were used. The 
base failure rate data adjustment in order to estimate 
the failure rate of the component λC follows the general 
methodology of [11] and comprises four consecutive 
steps: 
1. Sourcing of base failure rate data λB and 
additional information 
2. Environmental factor πE application;  
3. Specific failure mode factor πFM, if applicable 
4. Data source uncertainty factor πDS 
 
DSFMEBC πππλλ ⋅⋅⋅=  
Equation 1: Base failure rate adjustment 
The adjustment of failure rates to account for 
environmental influences that have not been prevalent 
during the failure rate collection and the resulting base 
failure rate is widely used in reliability predictions. The 
parts stress analysis proposed in [11] involves a simple 
multiplication of base failure rates with empirical 
factors.  
 
The difficulty lies in the determination and 
applicability of those factors towards the wave energy 
application. The factors in the MIL-HDBK are given 
for electronic parts and components, where the base 
failure rate has been established through laboratory 
experiments. So if, e.g. industry specific failure rates 
are used for an electric component of a WEC (e.g. 
circuit breaker) these factors cannot simply be applied. 
In this case it might be advisable to calculate the 
difference of distinct environmental conditions, which 
are then more applicable. Table 1 presents a matrix of 
factors that can be used to adjust failure rates from 
various environments towards the environment that will 
be encountered for WEC applications (highlighted in 
grey). The stress level in naval conditions is about 10-
15 times higher than in benign laboratory conditions 
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(GB), between 1.5-2.5 higher than in ground fixed (GF), 
and 1-1.5 times higher than in mobile applications. The 
conversion from a sheltered marine environment NS to 
an unsheltered or undersea marine condition, as it 
might be necessary for the application of OREDA data 
towards WEC, implies a factor of 1.4-1.6. 
 
GB GF GM NS NU NUU NSB
Factor 0.38 2.50 4.20 4.00 5.70 6.30 4.00
Environment
Ground, benign, GB     0.38 1.00 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.10
Ground, fixed GF     2.50 6.58 1.00 0.60 0.63 0.44 0.40 0.63
Ground, mobile GM     4.20 11.05 1.68 1.00 1.05 0.74 0.67 1.05
Naval, sheltered NS     4.00 10.53 1.60 0.95 1.00 0.70 0.63 1.00
Naval, unsheltered NU     5.70 15.00 2.28 1.36 1.43 1.00 0.90 1.43
Naval, undersea NUU     6.30 16.58 2.52 1.50 1.58 1.11 1.00 1.58
Naval, submarine NSB     4.00 10.53 1.60 0.95 1.00 0.70 0.63 1.00A
p
p
li
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o
n
  
en
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o
n
m
en
t
Base failure rate environment
 
Table 1: Environmental loading adjustment factors for 
different base failure rate environments [11] 
Environmental adjustment factors imply a multitude 
of unspecified failure causes. A more accurate 
approach is the application of failure mode specific 
factors which is applied by the chemical processing 
industry [13]. For a specific component (e.g. a valve) 
the failure causes (process medium factors, external 
environmental factors and location factors) are 
identified and subsequently quantified, so that 
particular failure rate influences can be considered (e.g. 
an adjustment factor of 1.21 for a corrosive 
atmosphere). The prerequisite to derive cause specific 
failure rate adjustments is a highly detailed data 
collection, which specifies the exact failure modes and 
environmental conditions. This increased effort is often 
not made for reliability databases because it incurs 
higher cost and organisational complexity. 
Nevertheless, it appears to be worthwhile for the wave 
energy industry to collect more detailed information. 
More accurate assessments through precise failure rate 
adjustments could contribute to decrease safety margins 
and cost. 
 
During the adjustment a double consideration of 
stressors is likely to occur, but intended. As an 
example, the environmental factor for a marine 
environment already implies the failure mode of 
corrosion. In the case of a component that is 
particularly susceptible to corrosion this can be 
accounted for by an additional failure mode factor. 
Consequently, the adjustment of failure rates is always 
subject to interpretation and judgement of the analyst. 
Where double consideration of stressors occurs, the 
resulting failure rates tend to be more pessimistic.  
 
Data uncertainty of raw failure data that has not been 
described statistically is usually expressed in terms of 
confidence intervals [14]. As the original sample is 
often unknown, the mean failure rates presented in 
reliability databases cannot be assigned to confidence 
intervals. Therefore, the following uncertainty bands 
are assigned to account for different data source 
qualities, i.e. a modification of upper and lower 
boundaries [15]  
• ± 10% for site- and industry specific data 
• ± 30% for generic data sources 
• ± 50% for failure rates derived by expert 
judgment 
3.1.3 Reliability calculation 
As a next step it is necessary to establish the related 
time-dependent reliability values which account for the 
system configuration in order to describe the system 
behaviour and identify critical components. Stemming 
from reliability theory, the formulas listed in Table 2 are 
applicable. In addition to the constant failure rate 
assumption it is further supposed that the system is not 
repaired within a 12 month period. One year is usually 
regarded as the shortest practical maintenance interval 
for the majority of devices [5], allowing access during 
larger weather windows in summer. Thus, the yardstick 
for overall system reliability is a 12 month period. 
 
R = 3 exp(- 2λt) - 2exp(-3λt)
R = 3 exp(- λt) - 3exp(-2λt)
+exp(-3λt)Active 1/3
Active 2/3
R = exp(- λ1 t) + exp(- λ2 t)
-exp[-(λ1 + λ2) t]Active
R = exp[-(λ1 + λ2) t]
-R = exp(-λt)
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Table 2: Reliability calculations for different system 
configurations  
3.1.4 Data variation  
A sensitivity analysis can be used to investigate the 
model response towards a parametric or a structural 
change and allows a determination of the uncertainties 
that are coupled to the model parameters. In the case of 
an insensitive model an estimated parameter may be 
used rather than a highly precise value. Large changes 
of system behaviour and outcomes for a parameter 
enable the identification of leverage points [16].  
 
In the present analysis failure rate data was 
categorised into three data source classes (site/industry 
specific; generic, expert judgement) in order to assign 
uncertainty boundaries. These upper and lower failure 
rate boundaries were used as input values for a single 
factor sensitivity analysis, which shows the effect of 
each component on the sub-system failure rate. This 
variation was then compared against the mean failure 
rate of the sub-system, allowing the identification of 
those components which have the highest impact due to 
high uncertainties and/or high failure rates. 
3.2 Reliability assessment for a hydraulic WEC 
As discussed earlier, the resulting failure rates of the 
assessed sub-systems should not be taken as an 
absolute figure, but as a general guiding parameter. In 
extreme cases component failure rates may vary by an 
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order of magnitude if the upper/lower value or different 
sources are considered. However, within the sub-
system prediction, the relative failure contribution of 
each component provides a valuable tool in design 
analysis [14]. The illustrative WEC system can be 
divided into four different sub-systems: 
• Mooring: Assuming a slack-moored device. 
• Structure: A thin-walled 20 mm steel 
structure is assumed for the main structure. 
• Power take-off system This subsystem 
comprises a hydraulic system with parallel 
units to provide redundancy  
 
Mooring, Structure and Power transmission are 
assumed to operate in series (Figure 2), i.e. if one of 
these sub-systems fail, the entire plant fails and is not 
able to produce electricity. The units for the power 
take-off operate in parallel in a ‘k out of 6’ mode. 
Power production can be maintained, although at 
reduced level, if individual units fail. 
 
Sub-system level
Mooring Structure
PTO 2
Power
transmission
PTO 1
PTO 3
PTO 5
PTO 4
PTO 6
PTO = Power take-off  
Figure 2: WEC Reliability block diagram sub-system 
 
It must be mentioned, that in this case study, only 
the reliability is assessed. The ability of the device to 
survive certain failures would be different, as a 
mooring failure could lead to a loss of the entire device 
whereas the failure of a PTO unit would have lower 
consequences than total loss, e.g. loss of revenue.  
 
3.2.1 Mooring 
From a reliability point of view, in the event of a 
mooring failure, operation would stop in order to 
repair/replace the damaged mooring. This relates to an 
in-series RBD configuration of the mooring 
arrangements.  
 
On a component level three components can be 
differentiated, the anchor, the mooring cable (or chain) 
and the attachment to the device. The failure rate 
database does not provide information about these 
single components. However, incidents and mooring 
failures have been continuously monitored for Floating 
Production Systems (FPSs) in the offshore oil and gas 
industry. A study by DNV reports that a failure of FPS 
mooring systems in the North Sea occurs once every 
5.4 years [17], which equals a failure rate of 
λMooring, FPS = 0.185/a.  
 
FPSs are used in the oil and gas industry to receive 
process and store crude oil at offshore production wells 
in deep water. Most of these vessels are moored to a 
central turret within the hull. This allows the FPS to 
rotate freely around the point of mooring to direct the 
bow into the prevailing wave, current or wind direction 
in order to minimise loadings. 
 
As the environmental conditions can be assumed to 
be very similar, and both systems are designed to be 
permanently moored the reported failure rate is used 
throughout this assessment. Nevertheless, there are 
significant differences in mooring designs for WECs. 
The required safety factor is higher in the oil industry 
due to the potential loss of life and risk of large 
environmental pollution as consequence of failure [18]. 
These risks are not apparent for unmanned WEC, so the 
safety factors (and installation cost) could be reduced 
but would result in higher failure rates. Thus, the stated 
mooring failure rate is likely to be a lower bound for 
WECs.  
Due to the assessment of reliability rather than 
survivability and the stated failure rate at sub-system 
level, the in-series configuration of the three mooring 
line assemblies with a failure rate of λC,Mooring = 0.185/a 
each is deemed to be appropriate. This results in a 
failure rate for the entire mooring sub-system of 
λMooring = Σ (λC,Mooring) = 0.555/a.  
3.2.2 Structure 
The structural sub-system can be regarded as in-
series configuration of hull, connection joints and seals.  
 
There is no generic structural failure rate information 
provided in the compiled data base as the structure is 
highly device and wave-load dependant. However, 
accident and failure rates for Aframax tankers have 
been recorded under the EU project ‘Pollution 
Prevention and Control’ (EU, 2004) and reported in 
[19]. Assuming the comparability of single hulled oil 
tankers and the structural housing of the WEC an 
indication of expected failure rates can be established. 
The average structural failure rate which satisfies the 
constant failure rate assumption was calculated at λSF, 
Aframax = 0.011/a. The applied failure rate is decreased 
by an order of magnitude, due to the smaller area and 
the less corrosive internal environment. Hence, the 
non-accidental structural failure rate probability is 
estimated at λHull = λSF, Aframax *0.1 = 0.001/a. 
 
The failure rate of the joints is extremely difficult to 
estimate, as information is virtually not available in the 
public domain neither on design nor on expected loads. 
A rather crude approximation is obtained through the 
mechanical linkage of the Circular Sea Clam, a WEC 
proposed in 1978 as part of the UK’s wave energy 
programme [20]. It consisted of 12 circular connected 
steel tubes with attached flexible air bags as PTO 
mechanism. The failure rate of the mechanical linkage 
reported in [7] is already factored for unprotected 
shipboard and given as λJoint, SC = 0.63/a. Assuming six 
connections for the illustrative device, the suitable 
fraction of λJoints = λJoint, SC * 0.5 = 0.315/a, is used as 
failure rate for the joint connections.  
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Component Base failure 
rate  
λB [1/a] 
Source Adjusting 
factor 
Component 
Failure rate 
λC [1/a] 
Remark 
Power take-off 
Hydraulic ram  0.087 [7] 2.8 0.24 Piston & cylinder p = 82 bar, Adjusted for 
p ≤ 300 bar (*2), marine unsheltered (*1.4) 
Manifold 0.002 [7] 2 0.004 Adjusted for higher p 
Accumulator 
high/low p 
0.263 [8] 1.6 0.42 Mean value adjusted for naval sheltered 
Hydraulic. 
Motor 
0.107 [8] 1.6 0.17 Geometric mean, adjusted for naval sheltered  
Electric 
Generator 
1.588 [2] 1 1.59 Critical failure, mean value 
Power Transmission 
415V busbar 0.004 [9] 2.3 0.01 Adjusted for naval unsheltered 
Transformer 0.053 [2] 1.4 0.07 Voltage: 441V - 5.5/6.6kV 
Adjusted for naval unsheltered 
Circuit breaker 0.184 [2] 1.4 0.26 Voltage: 441V - 5.5/6.6kV 
Adjusted for naval unsheltered 
Umbilical 0.037 [7] 1 0.04 Dynamic umbilical 
Sea cable 0.15 [7] 0.6 0.09 Voltage: 400kV; failure per 10 km length, 
adjusted for lower capacity  
Table 3: Component failure rates power take-off - and power transmission sub-system 
 
A generic failure rate is available for rolling rubber 
seals λSeal,R = 0.0364/a [7]. It is already adjusted for 
marine use, but the inverse application of hydraulic 
rams with significantly higher cycle frequency is not 
accounted for, so an additional capacity factor (120%) 
πCapacity = 2 is applied resulting in: 
λSeal = λSeal,R * πCapacity ≈ 0.07/a. For the structural sub-
system this yields: 
λStructure = λHull + λJoints + (12 * λSeal) = 1.19/a 
3.2.3 Power take-off 
A hydraulic system was chosen for the PTO system. 
The main subsidiary parts consist of  hydraulic ram, 
manifold, accumulator, hydraulic motor and electric 
generator (comp. e.g. [21]) and is shown as in-series 
configuration in Figure 3.  
 
Hydraulic 
ram
Manifold
Accumulator
high p
Accumulator
low p
Hydraulic
motor
Electric 
generator
Power take off sub-system
Component / part level  
Figure 3: RBD Hydraulic power take-off 
 
Industry specific or at least generic failure rates 
could be obtained for all components. Table 3 lists the 
base failure rates, data source, respective adjustment 
factors and resulting failure rates for the PTO.  
 
As each hydraulic PTO unit is assumed as series of 
components, the resulting failure rate is determined as 
sum of the adjusted failure rates from Table 3: 
λ PTO = Σ λC, PTO = 2.42/a 
3.2.4 Power Transmission 
The power transmission system can be regarded as a 
series configuration of busbar, transformer, circuit 
breaker, umbilical and sea cable. The busbar runs 
through the device and bridges the gaps between the 
steel tubes. Thus, a factor of 2.3 was multiplied to the 
base failure rate to account for the less sheltered 
environment.  
 
Even though the failure rates for transformer and 
circuit breaker come from an industry-specific database 
[2] they are adjusted by a factor of 1.4, as they are not 
installed on a stable platform but on a floating device. 
The specific failure rate for the sea cable (per 10 km 
cable length) is reduced, as the given capacity (400 kV) 
is not reached. Table 3 summarises the component 
failure rates for the power transmission system. Again, 
the resulting failure rate for the sub-system is easy to 
calculate: λPT = Σ λC, PT = 0.47/a 
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Figure 4: Reliability power take-off sub-system for different 
generating capacities (noo6) 
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Figure 5: Sub-system reliability 
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Figure 6: Reliability overall system for different generating 
capacities (noo6) 
Figure 4 highlights the redundancy effect of the six 
independent PTO units. The reliability for one 
operational sub-system out of six, i.e. 1oo6 capacity, is 
very high during the first 2,000 operating hours and 
decreases to a value RPTO, 1oo6 (8,760h) = 0.2 after one 
year. The reliability drops of significantly for higher 
generating capacities that require more hydraulic sub-
systems to be operational, namely 
RPTO, 6oo6 (2,000h) = 0.01, which is two orders of 
magnitude smaller than RPTO, 1oo6 (2,000h). 
3.2.5 Reliability calculations 
Referring back to Figure 2, the WEC system is 
modelled as a combination of series and parallel 
components. The six PTO units are configured 
redundant and it can be expected that they exhibit 
similar failure rates. A calculation with 6 parallel 
blocks was performed, to determine reliability values 
for all possible generating capacities between ‘1 out of 
6’ (1oo6) and 6oo6. As a next step, the sub-system and 
overall system reliability were calculated. The 
appropriate equations are given in Table 2. The results 
are shown in the following Figure 4 - Figure 6. 
 
The reliability values of the different sub-systems 
are compared in Figure 5. While power transmission 
and mooring exhibit reliability values RPT (8,760) ≈ 0.6 
after one year of fictitious operating time, the structure- 
and the PTO module sub-system indicate significantly 
lower levels of reliability < 0.3 after 12 months. The 
reliability increase through redundancy is illustrated by 
the two PTO curves with a series- (2oo2) and a parallel 
configuration (1oo2) of two units. However, the PTO 
seems to be the weakest link. 
 
The absolute reliability values of all sub-systems are 
low, i.e. significantly lower than R = 0.8 and would not 
be acceptable for a commercial device. These more 
than conservative values are due to the fact that 
throughout this analysis utilised failure rates are 
frequently outdated, subject to high safety factors and 
adjustments were crude. However, the comparison of 
the sub-systems shows that in particular the device 
structure and the power module exhibit low reliability 
values. This illustrates how even the application of 
“crude” data can be used to identify those areas where 
better failure rates estimates should be sought. 
 
Multiplication of the individual sub-system 
reliabilities yields the overall system reliability (see 
Figure 6). After 3,000 hours, the reliability for different 
generating capacities is as follows: 
RSys, 1oo6 (3,000) = 0.43; RSys, 4oo6 (3,000) = 0.05; 
RSys, 6oo6 (3,000) = 0.001.  
 
These extremely low values can be explained by the 
pessimistic failure rate estimates and additional failure 
rate adjustments. For some failures, e.g. seal leakage, 
the device could stay operational for additional hours 
without repair. Nevertheless, these kinds of failures 
were included, as they make repair activities necessary. 
Thus, the displayed values could be termed as 
‘theoretical reliability levels’. The ‘practical reliability’ 
would be significantly higher, as e.g. minor failures are 
accumulated until repair activities are planned. Such a 
failure differentiation is desirable but requires much 
more detailed information on both the device design 
and failure rate circumstances and could not be 
obtained for this study. These theoretical reliability 
values underline the need for high quality information, 
the investigation and improvement of high failure sub-
systems and the benefits of redundant configuration to 
establish high reliability without instantaneous 
intervention.  
3.2.6 Sensitivity analysis 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in 
the tornado chart diagram in Figure 7. They illustrate 
the degree to which the failure rate prediction is 
affected by the uncertainty of the individual 
components. The large bars at the top indicate a 
significant effect of the particular component on the 
resulting sub-system failure rate under the given 
assumptions. The worst/best case is specified as 
relative figure in relation to the mean failure rate and in 
absolute terms. 
 
The most critical components in the hydraulic PTO 
unit are the generator, the accumulator and the 
hydraulic ram (see Figure 7). The uncertainty range of 
the generator failure was judged as small (10%) 
because the data is sourced from the OREDA database. 
However, it exhibits a high failure rate 
λGenerator = 1.59/a, which accounts for most of the total 
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sub-system failure rate. For the accumulators and the 
hydraulic rams only generic data was available. The 
base failure rate of the hydraulic rams was heavily 
adjusted by a factor of 2.8, due to both the reverse- and 
marine application. 
 
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7
Electric generator
Accumulator
Hydraulic Ram 
Hydraulic motor
Manifold
Sub-system failure rate [1/a]
Worst case: +17%
λPTO, 1unit = 2.84/a 
Best case: -17%
   λPTO, 1 unit  = 2.02/a
λPTO 1unit, Mean = 2.42/a
 
Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis hydraulic power take-off unit 
 
The power transmission sub-system failure rate 
(λPT = 0.47/a) is dominated by the circuit breaker as the 
component with the highest failure rate λCB = 0.26/a. It 
must be mentioned, that the sea cable failure is given as 
specific value per 10 km of length. So if the distance to 
shore increases to more than 30 km, the sea cable 
would be the most critical component for the power 
transmission.  
 
The tornado chart for the mooring sub-system is 
omitted here as three identical components were 
assumed. The failure rate was determined for FPS 
moorings, so the uncertainty range was deemed small 
(± 10%), resulting in a best/worst case failure rate of 
λMooring = 0.50/a - 0.61/a. 
 
Comparing the variation of the analysed sub-systems 
it is apparent that the failure rate for the structure is 
subject to the largest uncertainty (± 35%), followed by 
the hydraulic loop (± 17%), the power transmission 
(± 11%) and the mooring (± 11%). The reason for this 
variation mainly lies in the data quality, but also in the 
absolute level of failure rate. If the uncertainty of those 
input variables could be reduced, the uncertainty of the 
overall system failure could be decreased. Two main 
approaches can be followed to reduce the uncertainty of 
failure rate predictions [22]:  
• More information/better knowledge of the 
identified input variable (e.g. more detailed 
failure rate data, precise failure rate 
adjustment) 
• Determine strategies to reduce the effect of the 
input variable, e.g. introducing redundancy or 
improve the component’s reliability 
 
It is evident, that the sub-systems and components 
with high failure rates, e.g. the main components of the 
hydraulic cycle are already designed in parallel 
configuration in order to decrease the failure 
consequence for the overall systems. A more detailed 
investigation of the behaviour, expected failure rates 
and failure modes of the identified components (in 
particular seals, hydraulic rams, accumulators, circuit 
breaker and generator) in the wave energy application 
could not only improve the reliability prediction but 
indicate possibilities of reliability improvements. This 
could be achieved through the deployment of 
prototypes and first commercial wave farms together 
with dedicated component testing. 
4 Discussion 
It must be noted that this case study is an illustrative 
example and would not reflect the performance of an 
existing device at a later stage in the development 
process. It might, however reflect the state of 
confidence for a device at an earlier stage of 
development, perhaps with some tank testing, but 
before many operational hours had been achieved at sea 
or large scale prototyping had been carried out. 
 
There are a number of reasons for the somewhat 
unfavourable results: 
• outdated/pessimistic and often generic failure 
rate data, 
• no repair activities considered within 12 
months time,  
• crude adjustments. 
 
Beyond these, the assessment of uncertainty of the 
outcomes was assumed to be only dependant on the 
data held within the database and did not include a 
contribution from factors such as the difference in 
operational loading. As an example one might consider 
the major components, the source of the data and how 
suitable it might be: 
 
Moorings: In this case the mooring failure rate was 
taken from an industry project relevant to FPS 
moorings. One would consider this data to be very 
creditable and ‘accurate’ for the given situation. 
However, how much should there be adjustment for the 
mooring of a floating WEC? Recent research to 
determine the mooring loads for a WEC [23] point to 
the possibility that, at least for some designs, the 
dynamic loads and rates could be quite different from 
those experienced by an FPS and this could 
conceivably radically alter (reduce) the failure rates 
from those in the study.  
 
Structure: This case is almost the opposite of that for 
moorings. The data used was based on quite a radically 
different type of structure and the data for the structural 
linkages from a relevant but relatively old study. One 
could certainly argue that modern engineering design 
codes and analyses for the marine environment would 
reduce both the failure rates and its uncertainty from 
those used in this model. 
 
PTO: The power take-off might be seen to fall 
somewhere in the middle in that there is a large amount 
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of relevant information of the various subcomponents 
from several different applications. The difficulty here 
is assigning relevant adjustments to account for the 
unusual operations of the components. 
 
In order to draw conclusions from already existing 
failure rate data it is necessary to assess the uncertainty 
of failure rates regarding the differences of operating 
environment and loading conditions, i.e. putting the 
failure rates in the context of the application.  
 
Detailed, device specific, reliability assessments are of 
course carried out or contracted by the device 
developers, e.g. [24]. However, the results are not 
published, making external reliability and availability 
measures in resource assessments subject to 
speculation.  
 
The key points to emphasise are that (i) there is a 
lack of generic data that a developer can apply at an 
early stage in the development process before the 
knowledge is built through development (ii) The 
analysis of any device from an external view will be 
compromised by lack of suitable data. This necessitates 
a joint effort of stakeholders in order to advance the 
development of the marine energy sector. 
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